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FROM THE CONTENTS

Blocs or Coexistence

Dr. J. ARNEJC

THE BERMUDA MEETING

SESSION IN PEKING

L. RADOVIĆ

EUROPE AND THE GERMAN ENIGMA

L. ERVEN

FRANCE'S EUROPEAN POLICY

Z. RAJH

NEW INSTRUMENTS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION

FRANE BARBIERI

March Session of People's Assembly

VLADA ŽEČEVIĆ

BILATERAL RELATIONS OF FPRY

PLANS AND POSSIBILITIES

IT would seem at first sight that the present international situation, burdened with new conflicts during the last six months, is not helping to speed the talks of the five powers opened on March 18, in the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee in London. The events of this period (Middle East, Hungary) succeeded in shaking the world and drawing even deeper the line of division and mistrust, but failed in what might have been logically expected — namely in relegating the problem of disarmament until better times. On the contrary, matters took a totally different turn: at the present session in London, East and West found themselves closer to each other than in March last year when conditions were more favourable and the cold war alphabet reduced practically to letters only. This difference in external conditions between March last year and March this year produced quite opposite results. March 1956: despite a substantial relaxation of tension in East-West relations, the talks on disarmament in London ended in failure. March 1957: despite rapid wide-scale aggravation of international relations, the Disarmament Sub-Committee succeeded already during the general debate in establishing some initial formulae which diminished differences and widened the sphere of possible agreements.

This apparent paradox is really only a reflexion of a deeper logic of international movement which makes the problem of disarmament as a key problem of the contemporary world, impose itself, on the great powers also as an increasingly pressing policy. In the struggle for initiative and under the pressure of public opinion, the

great powers found themselves compelled to take more constructive actions in the sphere of disarmament, which in itself means evident progress and a good sign. This also characterizes the latest proposals of the great powers as well as the atmosphere in the Sub-Committee where the earlier elements of propaganda moves are increasingly giving place to a method of serious and practical approaches to various aspects of that problem. Whereas the network of external, not particularly encouraging circumstances in which the great powers considered these complex and complicated problems give a special significance to the London session, the conciliatory tone of the talks raises realistic hopes that definite, though minimal agreements, might mean a turning-point in that field which is the source of a host of outstanding questions in the world.

The Sub-Committee was entrusted by the General Assembly of UNO with the task of making a study of all the proposals on disarmament and discovering a common platform for compromise arrangements. There are several proposals and all of them contain maximal programmes while their common trait is that they call for a serious discussion without being exclusive. The present talks centre on three main projects: the Anglo-French, the American and the Soviet. In order to show the differences between them, it is necessary to examine the elements of which they consist.

The Anglo-French project: proposed in March 1956 and supplemented by interesting novelties, constitutes a synthesis of basic elements of the Western and Eastern concepts. The full disarmament programme

is foreseen as evolving in phases and under international control but in such a manner that the corrective of each phase be the concrete situation in international relations. Already the first of three phases would see the freezing of armaments — both conventional and atomic — at the present level, which in practice would boil down to a truce in the armament race, and this could certainly serve as a realistic minimum and point of departure for further developments. The idea of this project to the effect that a wide world conference on disarmament be held in the first phase, deserves special attention while the clause which envisages that the great powers renounce the use of atomic-nuclear weapons (except for defence purposes) cannot be said to solve the problem, but could be taken as an initial step towards prohibition of nuclear weapons and gradual banning of atomic experiments. International control would be introduced prior to the implementation of the disarmament programme.

As a synthetic platform, the Anglo-French project has been drawn up in a spirit of compromise: in the question of control, it accepts the Western conception while as regards nuclear disarmament it shows a bent towards Soviet attitudes. As a whole, it is strongly imbued by the elements of European policy.

The American project: of all the proposed projects it is the least complete and does not embrace all forms of disarmament, while lately it underwent many changes. It is really a collection of elements from the Soviet and Anglo-French proposals with some new specific ideas. Its basic concept is control before disarmament, that is —

a system of efficacious international control should be established as a first measure in the process of disarmament. Control would be two-fold: land inspection and photographing from the air (Eisenhower's idea set forth at the Geneva Conference in 1955). As a new supplement, the plan also envisages a network of communications for controlling the movements of the armed forces. All of this, however, belongs to the so-called preliminary which would serve for gaining experience in exercising control, while a commission would then take steps for regulating other aspects of disarmament.

The American Plan does not provide for any conditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. Instead of this, it has been widened to include new clauses pleading for the control of guided missiles, the need for preventing further accumulation of nuclear weapons and for agreement on the use of the future atomic production for peaceful purposes. A special clause lays down that the great powers which organize atomic explosions should issue timely warnings about them. Thus the previous attitude when nuclear disarmament was *a priori* rejected, has been toned down while in some points it has been drawn closer to the Soviet project.

The priority problem, according to the American plan, is the reduction of conventional arms, armed forces and general military expenditures. The level of the armed forces in the first phase (one year after the agreement takes effect) would be reduced to 2,500,000 men for the USA and USSR, and to 750,000 for Great Britain and France. In the same period, conventional armaments would be reduced by 10% and general military expenditures in the same percentage.

Thus outlined, the USA plan too provides broad possibilities for discussion and negotiations.

The Soviet Project: is a plan of big changes and concessions, based on proposals of the Soviet Government of November 17 1956. Its basic points are:

1) reduction of armaments and armed forces and banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which would be achieved by the conclusion of an international convention, while the whole programme would be carried out in two phases (the first phase: 1957/58; the second — 1959). In addition to a considerable reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and besides a complete prohibition of the use and production of nuclear weapons, this item also foresees interesting novelties such as abolition of military bases on the territories of other countries, reduction of the military forces of the four powers stationed in Germany, especially Western troops in the NATO countries and Soviet in the Warsaw Pact countries, while the sums thus saved in the army budgets would be used partly for aid to under-developed countries.

2) establishment of international control over the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons both through the International Control Agency and by way of inspection — land (at key points) and air which would be exercised only on the territory of Atlantic and Warsaw Pact countries and this to a depth of 800 kilometres from the line separating the armed forces of these pacts;

2) the creation of a zone of limited and controlled armaments in Europe which would embrace both parts of Germany and

the neighbouring countries. Valid for this zone would be the prohibition of nuclear armaments, reduction of the armed forces of the four great powers and abstention from the use of force in the settlement of disputes.

Standing side by side as concepts and frameworks for negotiations, these three plans afford a view of the measure of concord achieved so far and the extent of divergence which still divides the rival sides.

Points of agreement: among the mutual concessions which illustrate an undoubted and big step forward in drawing the viewpoints closer to each other, one specially remarks those which have shortened the span between the two conceptions on the most disputed question: the problem of control. Americans have adopted the Russian proposal on land inspection while the Soviets agreed to the American on inspection from the air (at present only in principle and in a restricted sense). Another important factor is the coordination of views on the question of objects to be subjected to control and of terms for the gradual reduction of armaments.

In contrast to the earlier attitude, the Soviets do not insist any more on the preliminary banning of nuclear arms and agree to separate conventional armaments from nuclear which is an important concession to the American concept. No less important is the agreement that the level of the armed forces be reduced in the first phase in keeping with the American proposal, while placing the conventional armaments in the foreground. Although they are an obvious reflection of the achieved balance with the USA in nuclear armaments, the new Soviet concessions increase the prospects for partial agreements in the sphere of conventional armaments.

Divergences: viewed as a whole, they boil down to the problem of control but they are still sufficiently profound and essential to warn against exaggerated optimism. Starting from the standpoint that the question of control is above all the question of mistrust, the USA insists rather rigidly on the setting up of a control mechanism ahead disarmament, which the USSR, for reasons of its own, is not prepared to accept, nor the plan of air inspection over the Soviet territory. This context also leaves a series of uncleared concepts on the functions and powers of the control apparatus.

Nuclear disarmament is another serious point of disagreement. The Americans do not agree to the prohibition of either production or experiments because atomic power is the backbone of their strategy; the Russians are in favour of prohibition as they are superior in conventional armaments and military effectiveness. Conflicting interests lead to different proposals, while both keep the two powers away from a possibility of agreement in this field.

Hence we must greet the initiative of other countries which are less burdened by the big power complex and therefore more conscious of the danger to which world is open as a result of unbridled competition

in armaments. The United Nations have asked the Sub-Committee in London to examine the proposals of other countries as well, for it is today appearing more than ever correct that such a problem as disarmament, which amounts to a dilemma: war or peace, cannot and must not be only the affair of a small number of great powers, but of all peoples together, equally threatened and equally interested in peace and survival.

The proposals of other countries which have been submitted to the UNO, have a positive quality in that they tend to avoid the weak aspects of the plans of great powers: insistence on maximal programmes and global, all-embracing solutions. Instead of a unified programme which is unrealizable under the present conditions, they offer partial arrangements which are possible under present conditions. Thus, the Canadian-Norwegian-Japanese project foresees only the limiting of nuclear experiments; the Indian — banning of nuclear weapon tests, that is, only that which is possible to achieve today. A wider and equally realistic variant was submitted by Yugoslavia to the UN Commission for Disarmament in July last year.

The Yugoslav proposal: its basic idea is that disarmament is a sum of such problems as cannot be solved at once, but gradually and without conditioning one agreement by another, which nonetheless cannot be left unsolved if mankind wishes to eliminate the risk of self-annihilation. Hence the only way out of this situation is to consider the less ambitious programme and achieve the first limited agreements.

As a first step in this direction, the Yugoslav draft envisages as much as the present conditions and measure of international confidence allow: an initial agreement in the sphere of reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, cessation of experimental nuclear explosions, reduction of military expenditures and first steps in field of nuclear disarmament.

If the problem cannot be solved as a whole, it can be solved in parts, in such a way as would provide for an agreement paving the way for another. If it acted in this way; that is, linked consideration of its maximum plans with the practical effort to find a solution for one or two aspects, the Sub-Committee would make a decisive turn in the field of disarmament.

The seeking of agreement in the direction of a suspension of the armament race and abandonment of further experiments with nuclear weapons would be at present the most adequate task from the viewpoint of possibilities and positive influence on international relations. Even more than an initial step in the direction of solving disarmament problems: the first swallow which announces the advent of spring.

EUROPE AND THE GERMAN ENIGMA

L. ERVEN

The first part of this examination of domestic and foreign policy of Western Germany, and of the position of the two Germanies in international relations was published in the last issue of this publication.

In this second and final instalment the author examines the line of development of Western Germany within the framework of the Western bloc together with the various positions of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democratic opposition to the prevailing foreign and domestic policies of Western Germany together with various aspects of the overall German problem.

THE international position of Western Germany is characterized by several basic facts.

First of all, her economic stability is a factor of her independence. It is the fact that, in the economic field, Western Germany has surpassed the development and possibilities of many countries which defeated Germany in the war. She has freed herself from dependence on foreign economic assistance and ensured the necessary basis for independent development, for an independent home policy and foreign trade.

Her economic independence is not absolute, since such independence no longer exists in the world. But, her economy has freed itself from dependence on and subordination to the economic and political conceptions of the Western Allies, developing to the degree of interdependence which is the basis of equality and normal international cooperation.

Today, West German economy has an active balance sheet, and in foreign economic relations Western Germany is a creditor of most members of individual European economic organizations of which she is a member. She is a creditor of many other European countries too. In this respect, her recent agreement with Great Britain, under which she is to pay a part of the expenditures needed for the maintenance of British troops in her territory is very significant. Most of the contributions which she is to make under this agreement are to be given as assistance to the British economy. Thus, Western Germany is in a position to grant assistance to her recent conquerer.

Through the favourable economic progress and growth of her economic potential, Western Germany fully affirmed her independence and sovereignty. She originally acquired the attributes of an independent state on the basis of unilateral decisions and agreement of the Western Allies, which she subsequently signed as legal instruments of her independence. With her economic independence, the consequence of the growing and expansion of the economy, she has secured the necessary pre-

requisites for further strengthening and defence of this independence.

On the other hand, Western Germany is included in the Western system of collective security, as an equal number of the Atlantic Pact and the West European Union. The original idea in the West was to secure the Western German military and economic potential for the defence of Western Europe under a definite plan — first the European defence community plan and later in the West European Union, in which Western Germany's contribution would be under the control of the other allies of Western Europe. But, this plan underestimated the factor of the Western German independence and sovereignty as a function in the development of her own military and political positions. A system of collective security with some kind of tutorship over a member allowed to develop freely could have perhaps been maintained if Western Germany was politically subordinated and economically weaker and dependent on the Allies. But, with the politically equal and economically independent Western Germany such a system cannot but prove unrealistic.

Today, Western Germany is still developing her position in the Atlantic Pact, together with the renewal and development of her own armed forces. But, although she has not yet completely fulfilled the programme of her contribution to the Atlantic community, which was stipulated when she joined the Atlantic Pact, she has already become a significant factor in that system and in the policy of European security. Her role in this respect can only increase in proportion to the decreases which, for various reasons, may take place in the roles played by other allies. Her future does not depend any longer only on the Atlantic Pact, or the Pentagon, or Paris, but also on herself, because her internal development is constantly gaining in independence from the control and influence of the Western Allies.

One of the significant changes which took place in the evolution of the Atlantic Pact is manifested in the increasingly more important place which developments

assign to Western Germany. She has not yet occupied this place fully, mostly on account of the delays in the planned organization of her military force, and it may happen that some turn in her foreign policy may well endanger the present conception of the Atlantic Pact. However, under present conditions, providing that they do not change, the strengthening of the role of Western Germany in the Atlantic Pact at the expense of some other Western Allies cannot be avoided or prevented, because it is the result of the growing strength of her military power, regardless of possible contractual limitations and reserves.

The future military policy of Western Germany, both in organizing the armed force and in relation to the Atlantic Pact, is the subject over which the Bonn Government and the opposition disagree. Lately, particularly after Dr. Olenhauer's tour of the United States, government circles have been emphasizing the intention of the government to speed up its work on the organization of the army, as well as its loyalty to the Atlantic Pact, in contrast to Dr. Olenhauer who voices some reservations towards the Atlantic Pact and the plan for a large German Army.

But, regardless of whether the views of the government or the opposition will prevail in the future Western German foreign policy, Western Germany will place the Atlantic Pact and the whole system upon which it is based before very complicated problems: the policy of Dr. Adenauer, which is for greater German participation in the Pact — before the problem of equalizing German influence with that of the other member states, and the policy of Dr. Olenhauer, before the problem of ensuring Western Germany's participation in the Pact together with her contribution. The Western bloc would be placed before even greater problems by a united Germany, no matter who would be at the hold of the new state — Adenauer, Olenhauer or anyone else.

Western Germany is included not only in the military and political, but also economic organizations of the Western bloc. If we consider the development of the West European economy as a regional system of an economic entity, and the various forms of integration in that area, we cannot fail to see that Western Germany, as an independent state and equal partner, is deeply committed in various institutions and organs through which a joint West European economy is being created. After some multilateral economic conventions and the Coal and Steel Community, a joint market and an agency for nuclear energy are now being organized in Western Europe. This joint market will include also the African possessions of its individual members, and Western Germany will participate in the economic development of such possessions by providing as much capital as France, and much more than other members of the market. In that way, Western Germany's economic influence, already strong in Western Europe, will be extended to the African continent as well.

Through all these forms of close political, military and economic cooperation, with varying degrees of integration, Western Germany is included in all joint instruments of West European policy. She has become a component part and one of the West European system. She could not withdraw from it, either of her own will or forcefully, without shaking it from its foundations. In other words, this means that today the entire West European system, as established by the military and economic formations in the area, depends on the existence of Western Germany such as she is. The present position of Western Germany explains also the attempts of the Soviet diplomacy to establish contacts with the Bonn government and start negotiation with it, attempts which the Western side interpret as a manoeuvre to draw away Western Germany from the alliance of the Western powers and so weaken the unity of the Western bloc.

The Western powers, judging by the relations which they establish with Western Germany, treat her as a definite and permanent form of the German state, with presumptions that a united Germany, too, would accept the same positions and the same policy and so continue to occupy the present position of Western Germany. Thus, the Western bloc not only ignores the existence of Eastern Germany, but also exclude all possibilities of any other solution of the problem of German unification. Such a policy, until recently, was also pursued by the Western German government. But, in the final resort, this policy has always been a policy of a political coalition and a parliamentary majority. It has had sound positions in Western Germany, but it kept weakening in such positions, together with its chief, and, in its conceptions, lagging behind the development of the international situation and new requirements of German and European policy. Consequently, certain shifts might have taken place in the mood of the electorate. In addition to the official policy, whose initiator is Dr. Adenauer, the opposition, too, has evolved a policy of its own which in many questions differs from the official line. Therefore, changes which may be made in the country's foreign policy if the opposition wins the general elections would create great complications in relations between Western Germany and the Western bloc and possibly lead to greater changes in the foreign political position of Western Germany too.

The United States tour by the chief of the Social Democratic Party gave him an opportunity to explain to his American hosts, who are particularly interested in Western Germany's policy, the views of his party on the problems of German unification and European security. Chancellor Adenauer, in his correspondence with the Soviet leaders, also explained the attitude of the present Western German government on these problems. Other officials have done the same. It is, therefore, possible to draw a comparison between the views of the two chief political groups before their great contest at the forthcoming elections.

There are certain matters in which both sides are, on the whole, in agreement. One of these the alliance with the Western bloc. Although Dr. Olenhauer, has his own views on individual problems of Western Germany which differ from those of Dr. Adenauer, the foreign political plan of the Social Democratic Party stands for cooperation with the Western Allies. But, in this, Dr. Olenhauer does not conceive the role of Western Germany in the same way as Dr. Adenauer. He is for a more independent assessment of Western policy. The difference is primarily in the methods and tactics, but it may lead to essential differences in time. One day during his tour of the United States, Dr. Olenhauer confirmed that in case his party wins the election his government would respect all agreements on Western Germany's cooperation in the Western military and political organizations, although he does not fully agree with such organizations. This was an expression of solidarity, but it is not an absolute guarantee that there will be no changes in relations arising from these agreements. Logically, one would conclude that in further development of these relations a government led by Dr. Olenhauer would apply its own conceptions, and not the conceptions of Dr. Adenauer. Accordingly, Western Germany, led by the Social Democrats, could prove to be a different factor in the Western bloc and its system of mutual relations that it is now under the Christian Democrats.

In a similar way, Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Olenhauer more or less agree on the problem of unification. They both consider that the unification of the country can be solved only by agreement of the four powers. But, they disagree on the question of how this agreement would be approached, on what it should contain. In this respect, Dr. Adenauer is still backing up the views of the three Western powers as last formulated at the Geneva conference in 1955, while Dr. Olenhauer allows for certain modifications in these views.

In a letter to Bulganin, Dr. Adenauer again repeated that the Western German government — and that is in accord with the attitude of the Western bloc — will not recognize Eastern Germany as a German state, and accordingly, he rejected the Soviet proposal that the two Germanies should establish contact and start talks for unification. He proposes that unification should be carried out through free elections on the whole territory under the same conditions, and appeals to Bulganin to allow such elections in Eastern Germany. With his sentence; „Give freedom to the 17 million Germans“, he expressed his opinion of the state and legal position of Eastern Germany.

The view of the Social Democratic Party on Eastern Germany as a state and political regime is similar to the general attitude of the Western bloc. In a statement made in San Francisco, Dr. Olenhauer said that his party was „firmly against the so called people's democracy in the Soviet zone of Germany“. The Social Democratic Party rejects every offer of the United Workers of Eastern

Germany for cooperation. But, Olenhauer does not reject, as Adenauer, the possibility of contacts and talks with Eastern Germany. In New York he even mentioned the possibility of an agreement with Eastern Germany. Perhaps he would not be persistent in rejecting political talks with Eastern Germany if that could lead to an agreement of the four great powers. In this matter, as well as in some other, Dr. Olenhauer seems to be less orthodox than Dr. Adenauer, although we cannot speak of any contacts of his party with the United Workers Party of Eastern Germany or with the Soviet Union.

In view of the participation of Western Germany in the military formations of the Western Bloc and of the attitude of the future united Germany towards these formations, differences between the two parties are far greater. However, the question of German unification depends on this question as much as on the question of methods.

In his reply to Bulganin's letter, Adenauer confirmed the loyalty of Western Germany to the Atlantic Pact. "The Federal Republic", he said, "remains and will remain with her partners in the Alliance". He says that the Alliance is of a defensive character and that it is "evident that it can serve no purposes contrary to this defensive character".

His foreign Minister, who was on a visit to the United States after Olenhauer, confirmed this attitude of his chief, saying that Western Germany was "decisively loyal to the alliance with the Western world", and that the "present Federal Republic and the future Germany must live in unbreakable friendship with the free world".

The political security of the present Western Germany government is based on the organizing of a strong armed force and on cooperation with the Atlantic Pact. As the President of the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee said (also in the United States), "the only way to check the expansion of the system (satellites) in Europe is to strengthen NATO's conventional forces, including the armed forces of the Federal Republic". "Our security can be ensured only by strengthening the relations with the Western powers and by organizing the West German forces with NATO".

The leader of the Social Democratic Party has quite different views on the matter. He says that the "North Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts have not passed the test" and that the "existence of the two German armies, which are partners or instruments of stronger powers, endanger, not only the security of Germany, but the security of Europe as well". Instead of the system of antagonistic military blocs and alliances, he recommends the "formation of a new system of collective security which would replace the existing military alliances in Western and Eastern Germany". For him, the question of the participation of a united Germany in the Atlantic Pact does not even arise. He considers that the future Germany should not join any of the military blocs, but that a general sys-

tem of European security should be organized, in which the armaments of Germany would be restricted by an agreement of the great powers that would guarantee her security. Therefore, he is against any excessive rearmament of Western Germany.

His opponents interpret these views in their own way, saying that he inclines towards Germany's neutrality, which they reject. Von Brentano expressed his view on this matter in Washington, saying that the "advocates of a neutral Germany show a surprising lack of common sense". Olenhauer's plan is being said to be an "ideal dream", a "danger to the existence of Germany as a free nation". To these remarks Olenhauer replies that today Germany is in fact "neutralized in the worst possible way". The two parts of the country depend on two antagonistic military systems".

The contradictions between Adenauer's and Olenhauer's views do not appear only in the foreign political matters. They also manifest themselves in questions of internal policy. But this conflict is of lesser importance and interest to the foreign observer, except in matters touched upon in this article which affect the international position of Western Germany and the problem of German unification.

This problem, in fact contains two problems — the problem of the methods to be followed in unification, and the problem of the international position of a united Germany. From the European viewpoint, the problem of the position of a united Germany is of greater importance than the problem of the manner of unification, which is or should be the concern of the German people themselves. The methods of unifying the two parts of Germany is of international significance only in as far as it affects international peace and as it involves the possibility of introducing into a united Germany germs of trouble and unrest which may endanger world peace.

In the event of Olenhauer's victory at the elections, the present system of Western Europe — in as

far as it depends on Western Germany — would be shaken from its foundations, for, as we have said, Olenhauer considers the chief idea of that system — Germany's participation in the Western bloc — as an obstruction to German unification. Therefore, although his conceptions are not widely discussed in the West, the Western Allies would not be too pleased with his victory.

In this respect, the ideas of Dr. Olenhauer have more points of contact with the Soviet Union than with the United States. For, the policy of the Soviet Union demands the dissolution of the Atlantic Pact and the organizing of a system of European security. But, on the other hand, when we consider Eastern Germany, his ideas have more points of contact with the Western bloc than the Soviet Union. The policy of Dr. Olenhauer, just as that of Dr. Adenauer, demands that the Soviet Union should sacrifice Eastern Germany, but the policy of Olenhauer contains greater guarantees for the security of the Soviet Union than the policy of Dr. Adenauer, which stands for the present system of military organizations of the Western bloc, with Germany included in them.

As far as Dr. Adenauer is concerned, his victory would confirm the policy of the Western bloc in Western Germany, it would also strengthen the position of Western Germany in that bloc. If the former is favourable for the Western bloc, the latter need not be such. For, with strong positions, Western Germany may change or modify her present policy in accord with its own appraisal of German interests. While earlier Dr. Adenauer's policy depended on the Western bloc, now the Western policy becomes dependent on support from Dr. Adenauer. In any case, of the problem of Germany is the chief problem of European security, or one of the chief problems; Western Germany plays an important and independent role in it, a role which may turn Germany into an arbiter between the East and West contradictions in a way that her leaders may find useful in order to create such a Germany to their own liking.

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BLOCS OR COEXISTENCE

J. ARNEJC

THE session of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, SEATO, which wound up a few days ago again raised the question whether the existence of such and similar organizations is justified or not. A survey of the situation in all the existing pacts does not afford an encouraging picture of their adequacy and usefulness under the present conditions. While not dwelling on the problem to what extent these pacts actually represent the regional organizations and the provisions of the UN Charter, they are creations which at the time of their inception had a certain justification, but today have transcended their original schemes and no longer correspond to their initial tasks nor do they exert a positive influence on the further development of the territories on which they are located. The survey and analysis of the activities of these pacts show that they are beset by many contradictions which contribute little to their consolidation and strengthening.

The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization was set up after the Geneva Conference and truce in Indochina as a mechanism which should have rallied the countries of that area in the face of the alleged threat of aggression and especially subversion in all countries of Southeast Asia, not only those belonging to the pact after the breakdown of French domination. This subversive enemy is international communism which is fairly vaguely defined so that this qualification may refer to all movements aiming at the promotion of sovereignty and independence of the peoples in these regions. The fact that SEATO is directed against the national liberation movements and especially against People's China was confirmed by this year's session during which the situation in Laos was discussed, and the problem of the large number of Chinese living abroad examined while particular insistence was laid on the non-recognition and curbing of the growing international prestige of People's Republic of China.

In view of the composition of its members and the geographical distance between the member countries of SEATO, it is difficult to consider it a regional pact, while the results of its activities, especially its individual members, clearly point to the disunifying role of the pact in the countries in that area. There were also attempts to use the SEATO as a means of pressure against the countries which do not intend to join it. The statement by the Pakistani leaders that the organization should also discuss and work actively towards the solution of the Kashmir problem also by stronger measures if necessary, implying that the arms received may be used against India, only confirms the conjectures as to the real intentions of the pact. By such an attitude Pakistan antagonized some other members of the SEATO who are linked with India through the Commonwealth thus revealing yet another contradiction within the pact itself.

Similar phenomena have also appeared in the organization of other pacts, which showed their obsolete

and unconstructive objectives in a similar manner. During the Suez crisis when inconclusive meetings were held in the absence of some members, the Bagdad Pact revealed the full absurdity of its existence. The members of the pact could not oppose their members without reservation nor could they declare themselves in their favour. Their voice against aggression was aimed at the internal "market" in the Arab world, while the actual attitude of the members of the pact towards foreign aggression met with the bitter resentment of the public opinion in those countries. Aggression weakened the shaky positions of the pact while the Eisenhower doctrine dealt them yet another blow.

The contradictions within the NATO are so well known already that even the Council of this organization is not willing to discuss them. The individual countries have not succeeded in using the pact for their intentions, nor did the latter succeed in smoothing out the serious differences of view and contradictions between the members. In the same way the unity of the pact could not be manifested during the Suez crisis and still less during aggression against Egypt. Perhaps the advocates of the pact will contend that these were not the tasks of the pact and that such a unity outside of the framework of the fundamental military objectives was not even sought at all, but they cannot deny the fact that the attitude of the individual members clearly revealed substantial disagreements and antagonisms within the pact which render the latter an unrealistic organization under the present conditions. The tendencies to adapt the pact to the changed relations in the world, the stronger stress on the economic and political problems speak eloquently enough that the members of the pact are aware of the obsolescence of the old forms of interconnection.

Less obviously with the differences of views which are not so publicized, certain changes are also taking place in the system of the Eastern European countries within the Warsaw Pact. There can be no doubt that difficulties also existed formerly as testified by the fact that during the events in Hungary the Pact never appeared as a homogenous body. On the contrary the Declaration of the Soviet Government of October 30, obviously aimed at putting an end to the friction within the alliance. The new Soviet agreements with the individual countries on the stationing of Soviet troops could also be taken as an indication of the difficulties and objections actually involved. The differences between the fundamental social relations in these and Western countries does not preclude the possibility of comparison with some phenomena in the latter, as it seems in the long run that given manifestations in both are a result of similar if not identical causes, namely the inadequacy of military pacts in the light of contemporary tendencies and movements in the world in general.

Needless to say it would be exaggerated to affirm that this implies the disintegration of all these formations.

It would likewise be unrealistic to expect rapid changes in the process of further development of bloc tendencies which are manifested in various forms of unrest within the pacts. All this is a long term process which depends on the tendencies in international relations and the changes which are gradually taking place in the world. Consequently together with these changes efforts are being made to devise more adequate forms within the framework of the existing bloc conceptions which would be better adjusted to the new movements. Precisely those forces which are not included within the blocs and pacts exert a strong influence on these tendencies. Cooperation with these forces must certainly influence the quest for ways of adjustment to these forms and systems in the respective countries.

All these tendencies and changes actually only represent nothing else but the practical implementation of the principle of coexistence of countries with different political and social systems. It is not a question of two systems simply coexisting side by side on the principle of accepting the division of the world into two rival camps. Active coexistence is based on the postulate that there is no such thing as a pure system, but that the intermingling of new elements with the old interconnect the whole world and that it is possible to find appropriate solutions for mutual relations by the establishment of constructive cooperation and active support of the forces aiming at progress and peace in the world.

The opponents of the policy of coexistence who affirmed during last years portentous events and the deterioration of the international climate that it proved entirely ineffective, as it failed to prevent the recurrence of major upheavals, overlook the fact that it was precisely the principles of active coexistence which exerted a strong influence at the time of the greatest crisis. This influence was not always clearly manifested of course, but it was invariably the inspiration of all who sought an alternative to tension in the existing threat of war. The countries which strove to bring about the cessation of hostilities placed the dispute before the United Nations that it be discussed there and resolved in accordance with the Charter which formulates all the fundamental principles of active coexistence. The policy of coexistence, consequently did not prove ineffective and absolute, nor was it transcended and denied by the events, but exerted a persistent and continuous influence in the minds and actions of all people who contemplate it as the sole genuine solution and alternative to the policy of bloc exclusivity which reached a stalemate thus rendering it all the more dangerous.

By its principles and substances the policy of active coexistence is contrary to the bloc conceptions and was therefore accepted as a basis of foreign policy primarily by those countries which are not aligned within the blocs nor do they intend to create their own bloc. In both cases such a country would come into a contradictory position, as the bloc interests would also seek action against the policy of coexistence. Precisely because the bloc conceptions and mentality aggravated the attitude towards the policy of coexistence the latter was manifested all the more strongly in the process of pacification and the quest for solutions of controversial issues, thus confirming its value once again. Consequently the policy of coexistence was not defeated, as the blows to which it was subjected proved exactly the contrary, namely that bloc policy is a source of potential unrest, difficulty and disputes and that the role of the military

groups in which the big powers have the last word, is negative in the real sense of the word. The policy of coexistence showed its practicability during the difficult days of tension thus acquiring international recognition as it would be the only way to peace and cooperation.

PERSONALITIES AND POLICY

SAND, SEA AND DYNAMITE

THE aggression against the land of the pyramids and fellahs did three things: it caused bloodshed, it incurred fabulous financial losses and it resolved nothing. Now this tragic interlude is over and after ultimatums, bombing, airborne and seaborne operations, advances and retreats all the problems of the Suez crisis have again converged on the same point as before the synchronised armed action against Egypt. In other words, how to devise a solution by peaceful means which would harmonize the sovereign rights of Egypt on the Suez with their character of a vital international waterway.

Peaceful means imply the green bazaar table and goodwill. At a moment when all the fields from Egyptian soil are not removed nor all the sunken ships from the Suez waters salvaged, the atmosphere is still highly susceptible and requires great patience and statesmanlike realism.

There are, however, persons lacking both of goodwill, patience and realism and who consider that the hatchet should not be buried in the sand or thrown into the sea. A certain Menachem Beig, former commander of the extremist underground organization Irgun Zvai Leumi and the present leader of the Herut Party in Israel is on the warpath and challenging everyone from Nasser to Ben Gurion to a duel. At Beig's meeting the Israel flags are draped with black bunting, and the decision to withdraw is referred to as a second Munich, the war cry is echoing with the demand that the Government will free Gaza under the leadership of the Herut Party and war plans drafted in which even the USA are not worthy of respect: Israel would be able to resist American pressure if Italy would apply the right of veto in the Security Council in order to prevent the enforcement of sanctions against Israel (!). For Beig considers Ben Gurion a small broken man and to whom Beig prognosticates that it will be the last government of which he will be Prime Minister. What Beig, who likes to call himself David, thinks of Nasser after these meditations on Ben Gurion should not be a secret for anyone.

Legend has rendered David likeable because Goliath was the incarnation of evil. But Beig is not a modern David because the United Nations which embody world public opinion are not a biblical Goliath and this is clear. If the attitude towards peace becomes the fundamental criterion for the assessment of political and humanitarian values at present then it is no less certain that Mr Beig can only pretend to the title of war inciter.

Just because there are such people like Menachem Beig who are immune to all lessons of experience and history, however vivid and drastic they may be, — one should know how to appreciate every sign of goodwill, patience and realism on the sandy soil of the Middle East. There is no other alternative.

The Problems of France's European Policy

Dr. Zdenko RAJH

STUDYING the diplomatic history of France in the last three decades, we invariably conclude that a reorientation has taken place in French foreign policy since 1948, that is since the conclusion of the Atlantic Treaty. In the post war period there appeared a France new tendencies which were not in accord with the general ideas which had earlier been decisive in determining France's international position and her role in international affairs.

Earlier, owing to the colonial empire and events within it, French foreign policy had interests in many parts of the world, but, at the same time it was very active in Europe too. This then gave in greater weight and sway in the world. Due to her position in Europe and her European policy, France, during its modern history, and particularly between the two world wars, played one of the leading roles in the world even when larger and economically stronger countries, with great military potential, appeared on the world scene.

After the Second World War the situation in the world and in Europe changed considerably. Europe itself lost its earlier significance in world affairs, and the conditions for mutual political cooperation, such as those of the interwar period, ceased to exist. Owing to the political events during and immediately after the Second World War, and particularly to the cold war and bloc politics, the world was split and Europe itself devolved into two antagonistic parts, the contradictions and conflicts of which affected all spheres of international relations. France, too, found herself in this new system of power politics, the two camps whose poles are Washington and Moscow. As a result, two world policies began to be pursued; and their political, military and strategic moves affected the whole world, within which Europe figured only as one of the important positions for which both antagonistic great powers — the United States and the Soviet Union — struggled.

In such a political situation and sharpened international relations France, after 1948 ceased to pursue her traditional policy. The European space itself was so restricted that it was no longer possible to talk about Europe in the earlier sense of the meaning, but about two Europes — about Eastern Europe, and that part of the continent which, owing to various political and economic reasons, came to be called Western Europe which, apart from the West European countries, included also a number of countries from North, Central, South and Southeast Europe.

THE POLICY OF NARROW HORIZONS

The tragedy of French foreign policy is in the fact that, after the Second World War, it had to act in such a restricted scope of Europe, which no longer allowed France to maintain her earlier role in the world (as a great power) and preserve her positions and her coercive strength in relation to other European countries.

Earlier, her ability to rally a number of smaller European countries and so establish, in her favour, a balance of power in relation to her chief rival — Germany, and even in relation to Great Britain, was, in the period between the two world wars, particularly in the thirties, when Aristide Briand endeavoured to organize a European Union, one of the chief characteristics of its diplomacy. Today restricted to Western Europe, French foreign policy is of secondary importance in the general political strategy as determined by the United States through the Atlantic Pact. It is true that, at one time, the foreign political interests of France coincided with the interests of American foreign policy. At that time, France was receiving significant economic and military assistance, and, under the programme of the Atlantic Pact, a series of the so-called infrastructure were built in her territory (airfields, communication lines, oil depots, etc.). If to this we add also the "off shore" orders, which were beneficial for French industry, and which were a valuable source of dollar income, we must admit that the post war French foreign policy had some successes and that it contributed to the economic and military strength of the country.

But, it is another question whether this policy made a contribution to the international political strength of France. Here we must consider two problems. As we have said, France is a great colonial and European power, which, as an important political factor, influences European relations. The first problem is to determine to what extent her present foreign political orientation, which is still under the influence of the policy of the Atlantic Pact and the narrow West European cooperation, corresponds to her colonial interests, i.e. her position as world power. The other problem involves the question whether her present restricted European policy — restricted to Western Europe, Little Europe in particular — strengthens her long term role in the world, particularly in Europe.

FRANCE AND COLONIES

With her overseas possessions, France is today the greatest colonial power in the world. Of the total 10,991,000 sq. km. of colonial territories in the world, France holds as much as 4,372,000 sq. km., Great Britain about 2,300,000 sq. km., and the rest is largely in the hands of a number of smaller European countries. The French colonies are not as densely populated as the British, but the total number of inhabitants in these colonies is almost equal to that of the British colonies, and amounts to 56,857,000.

It is understandable therefore that the historical crisis of the colonial system affects France more than any other power, the more so since, in the question of the emancipation of colonial peoples, she does not take the same attitude as Great Britain. In contrast to the British policy, which allowed colonial peoples to develop

towards independence, France is trying by all means at her disposal, including armed forces, to keep her overseas possessions indefinitely.

In order to grasp the foreign political significance of such a policy, we must keep in mind that there is an essential difference between the crisis of the colonial system before the war and now. Between the two world wars, the crisis of the colonial system reflected itself solely through the struggle of the colonial peoples for independence, but this struggle then was waged between the colonies and the colonial powers, and it did not affect the interests of other countries. In other words, it did not have any repercussions on foreign politics. After the last war, the crisis of the colonial system grew in importance, becoming a general international problem. This was particularly seen during the Suez crisis. The struggle for independence of any colonial people is today linked in the international field with the actions of other colonial, dependent and even independent nations, it is waged in the United Nations and outside it, through the attitudes and actions of individual states, thus manifesting itself as a struggle for new international relations. While before the war, a colonial power could have waged a small war and sent punitive expeditions to its colonies without endangering its international position or discrediting its allies, today such an action could only isolate the colonial power and discredit the foreign policies of its allies.

This change in the process of the crisis of the colonial system is of great importance for the political strategy which is today being applied by the two leading powers — the United States and the Soviet Union. Both these powers are endeavouring to ensure and strengthen their positions precisely in the areas where people are persistently and jointly fighting against the colonial policy and relations. In this respect, the Soviet Union has a great advantage, because its world policy is, at the same time, an anti-colonial policy. The United States, on the other hand, in pursuing its world policy has to solve or smooth out contradictions between its chief partners — France in particular — and the countries for whose friendship it must fight in order to establish its own positions (political, economic and strategic) in their territories. But, seeing that these contradictions, in fact, cannot be solved, because colonialism has been condemned to failure, both as a system and practice, the United States endeavours to establish its own influence in such areas so as to replace its allies there in some way. All this is going on in an atmosphere of mutual friction and increasingly greater contradictions, which for the present are caused by the strategy of the blocs and the existing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

All this shows that France's present foreign political orientation in relation to the colonies is not in accord with her properly understood interests. Her national interests would be better served by agreed relations of mutual cooperation with the peoples which are emancipating themselves.

FRANCE AND EUROPE

The other problem of French foreign policy — its European part — is, to a certain extent, connected with the first. Although she does not give up any colonial possession voluntarily (except the possessions in India), France is nonetheless losing her economic positions in the present and former colonies. Apart from

this, the maintenance of the colonial system in the old manner imposes great financial burdens on her and so weakens her activity and role on the other side — in Europe.

The ever stronger economic and political ties with the West European countries somewhat influenced the orientation of French foreign policy, although not as much as the firmer linking with the foreign policy of the United States which forced France to subject herself to a certain degree of discipline and to give way in very essential matters concerning her security. Owing to this, French policy in Europe found itself in a blind alley, so to say. France's membership in the Atlantic Pact forces her to accept the basic ideas of the joint Atlantic policy which are in line with the general world policy of the United States in relation to its chief rival — the Soviet Union. This means that the most important position within the West European strategic area is Western Germany, which is the traditional rival of France. This is why France was exerting efforts to fulfil her obligations as a member of the Atlantic Pact and as an ally of the United States, trying to ensure herself in relation to Germany. This aim was the real reason why — during the consideration of the Schuman Plan which was later realized through the Coal and Steel Pool, France proposed the plan for Little Europe. In essence, France believes that, for her own security, it is very necessary to link Germany in joint economic and political organs and so prevent the excessive development of the German industry. At one time France went even further, trying to link Germany in a European defence community plan, which was to have its own political and military organs. But the plan failed owing to the opposition of a large majority of the French public and political forces in the Parliament.

At present, France is mostly engaged in the economic field. It must be admitted that in today's restricted area, i.e. within the European Coal and Steel Pool French German cooperation has produced some results. But the scope of this cooperation has proved too narrow. Economic and political reasons have forced the European Coal and Steel Community to expand its activity and approach the setting up of EVRATOM and to turn the joint market for coal and steel into a common market for all commodities. This was revealed as early as June 1955, at the Messina Conference, and some time ago an agreement was signed which will — within twelve months time — closely link the economies of the countries of Little Europe — France and Germany in particular.

However, the question of being asked whether such an orientation is useful from the viewpoint of long range perspectives even if we disregard certain factors which are connected with the still tense situation in the world. From the economic point of view, France cannot stand up to German competition. She may benefit from Germany through joint funds for investments in her colonies as well as through some other economic steps, but she cannot retain the position of the leading economic power within the scope of Little Europe. And in view of the German economic and military potential, she cannot remain the leading political factor in that community either — the more so since the further progress of the colonial system will inevitably decrease her influence and reduce her to European proportions, where she is in a weaker position than Germany.

There remains her cooperation with Great Britain as a factor which will certainly create an unfavourable

situation within Little Europe. Here a question arises whose solution is of interest to all European countries, because France's strength is an important factor in the European equilibrium. It is not, therefore, in the interest of France to affirm herself — apart from the existing bloc politics, apart from the devision of the world and

Europe — as a power which is capable of implementing a policy of European Unity? However, this will depend on the internal forces of France which could direct her European policy along such a road which would be much more beneficial, both for her interests and for her security.

LETTER FROM ROME

NEW INSTRUMENTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Frane BARBIERI

THE protracted talks initiated by the member governments of "Little Europe" two years ago in Messina were concluded on March 25 in the Roman Capitol by the signature of the agreement on European Economic Union which covers the agreements on the Common European Market and Euratom. The signatures A. Spaak on behalf of Belgium, Martino on behalf of Italy, Pineau for France, Luns for Holland, Beck for Luxemburg opened the process of European economic integration which should, within a twelve year period, bring about the necessary conditions for the creation of a big supra-national political community United Europe.

THE FRAMEWORK OF INTEGRATION

The framework of the European Economic Community has been thus defined by the instruments signed:

1. The agreement foresees within a twelve year period, divided into three stages of four years each, the abolishment of all customs barriers and trade restrictions between the six member countries as well as the establishment of uniform customs tariffs for commodity traffic between Little Europe and third countries. At the end of the first stage the barriers should be reduced by 25 per cent, 50 per cent by the end of the second while the conclusion of the transitional phase would mark the elimination of economic frontiers between the member countries.

2. The abolishment of all obstacles to the free circulation of labour and capital is also foreseen within the same term. Within the common markets labour would be guaranteed equal rights irrespective of country and nationality.

3. During the same twelve year period the member countries should implement a uniform farm policy, increase productivity and the technical level of farm production and organize the European agricultural market.

4. The signatory countries assume the obligation to create the necessary conditions for the free development of competition on the common market and that they will pre-

vent the conclusion of any treaties whatever between the enterprises which would be capable of hampering free competition and creating monopolies on individual sectors of the market. These restrictions will not be applied only in those cases when common efforts for the technical development of production are involved.

5. The governments of the six countries will coordinate their economic policies and bring about mutual cooperation in the efforts to avoid a deficit in the balance payments. A European Money Committee will be formed for the purpose of controlling the financial situation in the member countries.

6. The signatory states will create two joint common funds: the special European fund for the improvement of labour conditions and improvement of the standard of living, and the European investment bank which will foster economic expansion with a capital of one billion dollars, especially the industrialization of backward areas in individual countries.

7. The overseas possessions of France, Belgium, and Holland together with Somalia are included within the common market in order to broaden the area of economic expansion and increase the material resources of the common market.

Apart from the governments concerned, the realization of this programme should be managed by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community and its Assembly. During the period of transition the members of the assembly are elected on a proportionate basis by the national Parliaments from their ranks, while general political elections to the European Parliament should be held after the expiration of the ten year term. This would be a major step from economic to political integration of Western Europe.

INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS

The efforts towards European integration have already acquired certain experiences from which one can precisely determine the prospects for the success of this new attempt and the difficulties that confront it. The experiences with the failure of the EDC (European Defence Community) in the

French Parliament show that the European Economic Community will have to overcome new obstacles during the debate on the ratification of the agreements signed in the parliaments of the six countries. The governments have assumed the obligation to ratify the instruments signed until this summer, but the instability of some governments, especially the Italian, and to a certain extent the French does not make the fulfillment of this obligation quite certain.

Ratification is by no means the only and decisive difficulty on the way to the building up of the European Defence Community. By ratifying the treaty the member countries will only lay the foundations of an economic and political structure, whose project is by no means definite, all the more so as the authors of the EEC do not have identical views of this building structure.

European integration has passed through different stages of development so far and is subject to various and changing influences, so that the unification of Europe can no longer be contemplated exclusively in the terms which prevailed during the predominance of the clerical triangle De Gasperi — Adenauer — Schuman by weakening the predominant influence of the clerical parties in the process of European integration and the strengthening on the other hand of the initiative of the West European social democratic parties. The balance of power within the European movement has already been altered appreciably, United today in a common effort for the realization achievement of a united Europe the catholics and social democrats, — and a series of other political groups, — have considerably different views with regard to their conceptions of the future united Europe.

TWO CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF FREE EUROPE

Politically this contrast is reflected in the international role attributed by both sides to united Europe. The catholics, following the old conception of De Gasperi consider that United Europe should give new political, economic and military forces to the NATO, that the process of integration sho-

uld primarily be conceived as an act of strengthening the Western bloc and all links of cohesion which tie the West European countries with the USA. The opinions of the social democrats within the framework of the European movement developed under the influence of the last foreign political orientation of the British labourists so that an ever stronger tendency is felt to create a third world power out of united Europe, which would, in cooperation with Great Britain especially if and when the labourists assume power, appear on the international stage as an independent force and become a partner of the USA and the Soviet Union, as some kind of bridge of coexistence between the blocs. Therefore the tendency to acquire the most favourable position in the process of integration and adjust the united Europe as much as possible to their political conceptions can already be discerned on both sides today.

The social democrats count with the possibility of a labourite victory in Great Britain, the Social Democrats in West Germany as well as the creation of a strong united Socialist Party in Italy, while the catholics are counting with the consolidation of the Catholic government of Adenauer and the Italian Christian Democrats and the re-assumption of power in France and Belgium.

MONOPOLY OR STATE CONTROL

Apart from conflicting opinions as regards to the general role of United Europe contrasting views also prevail with regard to the nature of the investment efforts of the European Economic Community in the field of development of production, especially the introduction of automation and atomic energy. The social democrats consider that these investments should be of a state capitalist nature thus creating the necessary instruments for state control of economic development, while the catholics support the line of private enterprise, namely the assuming of investment funds by private capital, enterprises and monopolies.

Apart from these principled differences of view ensuing from the heterogenous structure of the European political forces, the European Economic Community is pregnant with other contrasts. The Agreement for instance foresees the curbing of monopolistic tendencies in production and on the market, but does not lay down concrete forms of state intervention against monopolies, so that it is hard to foresee the limits at present up to which the European monopolies will be able to develop, all the more so as some West European countries are already characterized by a vigorous growth of monopolies. As the programme of the European Economic Community also foresees the protection of its economy from the infiltration of foreign, especially American capital there is a genuine possibility that these defensive tendencies may become concessions which will enable the strengthening of the European monopolies.

Another internal contradiction threatens the European Economic Community in view of the conspicuous disparities in the degree of development of producer forces among the individual countries and the predominantly agrarian character of a given country in relation to the industrial character of another. The liberalization of commodity and capital exchange on the European market places the countries with a lower producer capacity in an inferior position towards the highly productive countries with greater competitive power.

Such fears are already being voiced in Italy. The Italian monopolies already tend to conclude agreements with the monopolies of other countries with a view to protecting their market, while the unutilized investment market of Southern Italy opens broad prospects for the inflow of foreign capital into Italy. The Italian farmers are worried on the other hand by the saturation of the European market and the high prices of Italian agricultural products.

THE PROBLEM OF OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

The inclusion of overseas territories into the common market with immense material and economic advantages also gave rise to internal conflicts. The countries with overseas possessions expect that the common investments by way of the European Community will enable them to consolidate their shaken colonial positions and resolve the crisis of their empires. They particularly expect that they will avoid the creation in their possessions of an economic and political vacuum, in which as shown by the example of the Middle East, the US capital seeks to penetrate thus replacing the political influence of the European colonial countries by American influence. The countries deprived of overseas possessions, such as Italy and Germany, show a far smaller degree of enthusiasm for this common action aiming at the preservation of European colonial positions, particularly because the clerical parties consider that under the present situation the strengthening of US influence in Africa is necessary and beneficial, and that competition between Anglo-French and US influence on this area is detrimental to the unity of the Western bloc, as stressed by Pope Pius XII in his interview with Vice President Nixon.

It would be wrong to assert, however, in view of the internal difficulties which beset

the European Economic Community that the EEC is faced with the same bleak prospects as the European Defence Community. At a time when automation and atomic energy are heralding a new industrial revolution, the liberalization of trade and pooling of investment resources with the aim of promoting and modernizing production are of vital importance to the smaller and less developed countries so that it is not incidental that the failure of artificial military integration led to this new more constructive attempt at economic integration. Besides this venture may already benefit by the positive experiences acquired by the European Coal and Steel Community and the Organization for European Economic Co-operation.

The clerical exclusivity of "Little Catholic Europe" expressed in the European Economic Community is today contrasted by the entirely genuine possibility of expanding economic cooperation by new agreements which would transcend the frontiers of the six countries. A special commission of the OEEC has already worked out a study on the linking up of economic investment and productive efforts of the other European countries with the European Economic Community. On the other hand, the implementation of Macmillan's Plan on the creation of a free trade zone between the European market and the Commonwealth are already foreseen. All this renders the foundations of European integration broader and more solid today. It depends on the conceptions which will predominate in the building of the superstructure on these foundations whether the edifice of United Europe will be a humble building of the Catholic isolationist Little Europe, or a spacious palace of progressive cooperation and economic, social and political progress of the European countries.

FORTNIGHT IN THE WORLD

THE BERMUDA MEETING

A conference formerly held at Bermuda has entered the annals of diplomatic history; this will not be the case with the recent meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan. Not because the recent talks between the two eminent statesmen (with the assistance of top level political and military experts) would be devoid of major political significance, but because their programme did not call for the enactment of any major decision and solution. The restoration of unity shaken during the recent period by disharmony in matters of principle and practical policy was the real purpose of the Bermuda talks.

The span of problems on which the leading partners and allies on both sides of the Atlantic exchanged views was extremely broad and no question of any greater significance was ignored.

The Middle East: The formula of agreement with the resolution of the General Assembly on the Gaza strip and Gulf of Aqaba and the principles adopted in the Security Council concerning navigation in the Suez Canal is so flexible and broad

that it does not preclude differences of views. However it is indubitably closer to the official American thesis in view of the priority role assigned to the United Nations in the solution of the Suez crisis which was also testified to by the tendency not to prejudice the results of Hammarskjold's mission.

The decision of the USA to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad pact which was received as a surprise in some quarters and somewhere as the expected thing, has interesting overtones. De jure it is a concession to Great Britain and support of a military mechanism which predominantly expressed British policy and pretensions in the Middle East. De facto it will reduce the leading British role in the Baghdad Pact to secondary positions. Another aspect is objectively the more significant as the Eisenhower doctrine aimed at being acceptable to all the Arab countries; is not the adherence of the US to the military committee of the Baghdad Pact a symptom that this aim was not achieved, and that it is essentially a move which marks a failure. The unconvincing

contention that US membership in the military committee (together with the previous membership in the economic and antisubversion committees) is not identical to US membership in the Baghdad Pact only shows that Washington is still pinning its hopes on the Eisenhower doctrine, this being the only reason why it does not wish to commit itself „wholly“ on the Baghdad Pact.

All in all, the fundamental contradictions between the USA and Great Britain in the Middle East remain as the aspirations of one partner inevitably conflict with those of the other. The two countries have not renounced their interests in this area but only defined the limits up to which open differences of view would not be dangerous for the common bloc interests.

Europe: The paradox that the USA divided by the Ocean are a greater advocate of European integration than Great Britain separated only by the English Channel becomes more understandable in view of the fact that the pitfalls of Little Europe may be indifferent in certain respects to Washington but not to London. Therefore Eisenhower persuaded Macmillan that Britain should engage herself to a larger extent in Europe, and that the reduction of British troops in the Rhine should not take drastic proportions, agreeing only to a certain degree with the affirmation of his colleague that this would not reduce their effective power. The agreement that the formation of a high tariff bloc be formed within the common market and free trade zone represents support for the British views.

The communique did not reveal whether the talks on the German problem were of a merely symbolical character. Bringing nothing new in this context it formulated the intention to support the rights of the German people to a „prompt unification in peace and freedom“. This qualification of time could also be attributed as the political need to extend a small dose of optimism to the citizens of the Federal Republic in this election year.

Asia: Great Britain adheres to the thesis that Asia is a lost country for her and that the old methods, under the new Asian conditions, cannot yield any lasting benefits. Britain therefore urges the adoption of a more flexible policy in this area (the Colombo Plan) and particularly with regard to China (the abolition of embargo). The USA still has not been reconciled with this fact, they still pin their hopes on the SEATO and support of the Chiang regime in Formosa, these being the cornerstones of their Asian policy, where new elements are extremely slow in penetrating.

The NATO and Defence: The NATO is again defined as the keystone of the US and British policy in the West, because the unity of the bloc is most completely expressed in the Atlantic formula. Therefore the thesis on the NATO acquired a place of honour in the joint communique. On the roster of problems examined in this context, two stand out in bold relief: that of the US military aid to Great Britain and the problem of nuclear experiments. Macmillan demanded successfully that „in the interest of common defence and economy“ the US set guided missiles at the disposal of Great Britain. This arrangement is not far from the conception that the British Isles should become the most prominent atomic base of the Western world. The demand of public op-

tion that H-bomb tests should be stopped not only because of the elimination of the potential danger of radiation, but because this would be a good prologue to the further talks on disarmament, was not accepted at Bermuda, although unusual attention was devoted to these questions: one third of the communique is actually a plea for the continuance of nuclear experiments. It contains two basic points: self control is necessary which would not permit nuclear experiments to acquire the character of real danger; the two Western countries would not allow the presence of international observers during their nuclear tests, unless the Soviet Union adopts this idea on a reciprocal basis.

This would be all, provided no secret agreements were reached which although denied are not excluded. Eisenhower departed satisfied while Macmillan also with a satisfied expression remained in Bermuda to wait for Canadian Premier Saint Laurent to discuss the Canadian fears lest the customs tariffs on the common European market threaten the Canadian interests, Canadian uranium and the visit of Queen Elisabeth to Ottawa.

After the Bermuda talks one may expect greater harmony in the diplomatic moves of Washington and London but one should not be deceived that a three day meeting was able to neutralize those antagonisms which do not stem from transient or subjective causes.

Session of Chinese Political Consultative Conference in Peking

THE National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held its session in Peking from March 5 till March 20. The session was attended by over 620 representatives of various social and national groups, mass organizations, political parties, non-party elements, religious groups, prominent personalities, and Chinese-emigrants. The conference was preceded by a brief session of the Supreme State Council (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Permanent Committee of the Assembly etc), at which Mao Tse Tung read a report „On the Correct Solution of the question of Contradictions Among the People“.

Mao Tse Tung's speech has not been published for the present, but one could see from later discussions what problems were specially touched upon in that speech. The further advancement of political coexistence between the Communist Party of China and democratic parties and non-party groups („Full coexistence between democratic parties“), the continuation of the policy of greater intellectual freedom in the field of science („Let various schools of thought compete between themselves“) and cultural and artistic creativeness (Let all flowers bloom at the same time), took one of the first places in Mao Tse Tung's speech.

Certain economic difficulties, occurring as a result of overstrained investments in the Five Year Plan and unforeseen material investments in the Socialist sector of agriculture, industry and trade, have been reflected on the living standard although it was considerably improved last year. The

increase of workers, and employees' wages and the purchasing power of peasants, in a situation when the raw material stocks are exhausted and when the market for industrial goods is inadequate, could not provide a solution again this year, all the more so as the purchasing power of peasants has become a special burden for the economy in 1956. Prime Minister Chen Yun, referring to this situation at the Conference, set forth various measures the purpose of which was to revise the present trends of economic policy. Steps have been taken to reduce capital investment to the utmost, with the exception of big projects. The proportions in industry will be adjusted again in favour of light industry — from 7:1 to 6:1, although the emphasis is still on heavy industry. Even greater attention will be devoted to the efforts for increasing agricultural production as well as to the quality and quantity of industrial goods. The need for the construction of workers' dwellings and schools has been particularly stressed. With a view to satisfying the basic needs of the population, steps will be taken to reduce the export of some food articles in which shortage is felt (oil, pork, etc.)

Although industrial production has been raised by 25% as against the situation in 1955, while agriculture in 1956 yielded about 10 million tons grains more than in the previous year, the Conference nonetheless approved the proposal of the Minister of Public Health, Li Te Chuan, for instituting „birth planning“ in the future, without which China will not be in position to „free herself from poverty nor become a rich and strong country“. In 1956 alone, China got another 15 million inhabitants. This is one of the most complex problems of China which will effect the economic policy of the country for years to come, even if the population remains in its present bounds.

Since last year's session of the All-Chinese People's Assembly, when forms were foreseen for ensuring greater democracy in the work of the lower organs of government, the convening of the local people's congresses has become regular practice; the participation of the masses in the local election of people's representatives in many regions rose to 90%, which is far more than in 1953; people's deputies carry on a systematic inspection of the work of local organs of government; democracy has strengthened in enterprises and cooperatives; the consequences of careless work of some officials of the courts of justice and public security are being eliminated. Members of the local Committees of CPPCC whose membership increased particularly last year, are also taking part in all these actions.

There is no doubt that these are great achievements in the direction of introducing active democracy in all sectors of life, especially if one bears in mind the economic and cultural backwardness of the country, which until lately was in the throes of semi-colonial slavery. On the other hand, this progress is not significant so much for its present reach as for the policy of the leadership of the Communist Party which is aimed at discovering solutions under the specific conditions of the building of socialism in their own country.

The Conference also examined the question of „contradictions among people under Socialism and between the people and their enemies“. This question has also been included in the resolution of the Conference: „The first mentioned contradictions, including the class contradictions between the

workers on the one hand and industrialists and businessmen on the other, should be approached from the viewpoint of unity and criticism and they should lead to a stronger unity on a new basis". The head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Lu Ting Yi wrote an article on the campaign for correction of errors as a form of internal party struggle, which was published in „Jen Min Ji Fao" during the session. The analyses set forth in the article, although primarily referring to the correction of ideological mistakes in party ranks, also had a direct bearing on discussions at the Conference which were on the theme „On the correct solution of contradictions in the ranks of the people". Lu Ting Yi wrote:

„Our party has created a method of campaign for correcting errors in order to solve the intra-party contradictions and thanks to this initial point, gradually established a series of methods of work for the elimination of contradictions in the people's ranks. This is the reason why the Chinese party is in a position to unite the democratic forces and to defeat the fiercest enemy".

These discussions had chiefly two trends: — on the one hand to define precisely the concept of the people's enemy counter-revolutionary (imperialist agent — as the Chinese press calls them officially) and draw a sharp line between enemy and all the others who formerly did similar acts and have been rehabilitated and are now participating in the building of Socialism, and on the other

— to give support once again to the method of correcting errors among those who accept the country's present policy, "to kill evil in them, and save the man". A more detailed treatment of this theme shows the resolve of the Communist Party of China to do away with manifestations of subjectivism, doctrinairism and bureaucracy in its own ranks, outside the party framework — in the remaining sections of the people — especially in remote regions, to put an end to rigorous actions toward individuals who "sin" against the existing norms of state policy. This detail too forms a part of the wide campaign for greater democracy in the country.

Luka Radović

YUGOSLAVIA TODAY



MARCH SESSION OF FEDERAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Vlada ZEČEVIĆ

PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

THE materials which the Federal Executive Council sent to the Federal People's Assembly in March 1957 include some proposals and materials which are attracting special attention of the public. One of these is certainly the Report of the Federal Executive Council for 1956 which goes up to make a book of several hundred pages.

To stress the significance of the activity and methods of work of the Federal People's Assembly and the Federal Executive Council we cite the basic chapters: The Social Plan and State System, The Federal Executive Council and Federal Administration, Economy, Social Policy, Public Health, Education and Culture, Internal Policy, Foreign Policy and International Relations and National Defence.

This document contains precious materials whose abundance of data have not nearly been exhausted by our press, in relation to the foreign public opinion.

During the first half of March, the Committee for the Organization of government and administration and the Legislative Committee of the Federal Council began the examination of the Draft Law on Attorneyship, the Draft Law on Changes in the Law on National Defence, the Draft Law on the Changes in the Law on Courts of Justice, the Draft Law on Changes in the Law on Public Prosecution.

The Draft Law on Attorneyship attracted the special attention of the public, although, at first sight, what seems to be involved is a material which regulates a

narrow field of our social and political life. However, the principles contained in the legal proposal on attorneyship have attracted much wider attention of the public than it was expected.

The Committee for the organization of government and administration together with the Legislative Committee conducted a long discussion on Art. 11, which, in its original formulation, elaborated the possibilities of having legal advice and aid given not only by lawyers but also by other persons. According to this formulation, not only lawyers but also other persons could be engaged to represent or be counsel for the defence of a party before law courts and other state organs in keeping with the existing regulations and procedure. It has been determined that the People's Committees in municipalities and districts can establish a special service for extending legal aid, whose functioning would consist in giving legal advice and drawing up documents about the statements of parties. The employees in legal services who have passed the attorney's examination can in definite cases represent and defend the parties before courts of justice, other state organs, institutions and organizations. In these cases the counsel employed by the People's Committee, would have the status of the plenipotentiary or counsel for the defence and in legal representation or defence, he would enjoy the same rights as a lawyer.

After discussion, the original clause of Article 11 was elaborated and formulated in such a way that the final draft, which the Federal Council adopted, lays down

that only lawyers can occupy themselves with the extending of legal assistance as a profession, while other persons can be plenipotentiaries of parties in suits and counsels for defence exclusively under conditions laid down by law. The clause on the setting up of a special service for legal aid attached to the People's Committees (jurists with practice) has been elaborated in more detail while parties can be represented only by advocates on the basis of agreement with the People's Committee.

In the second half of March the Federal National Assembly also received from the Federal Executive Council legal proposals for which both Chambers of the Federal National Assembly are competent: Draft of Decision on changes and supplements in the Federal Economic Plan for 1957, Draft Decision on changes in the budget of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia for 1957, Draft Decision concerning approval of the preliminary account of Federal budget funds for 1957.

The Committees for National Economy of the Federal Council and Council of Producers examined these legal proposals at separate meetings. Together with the draft decision concerning changes in the Federal Economic Plan for 1957, the Federal Executive Council sent the Federal People's Assembly, as supplementary material, the Decree on the distribution of incomes of economic organizations, which takes effect with the change of Chapter XVII of the Federal Economic Plan for 1957. As this involves a change of the whole economic policy as pursued so far in this economic field, the discussion in both Chambers brought to light important questions and concepts of principle in the sphere of politics and economy.

The discussion conducted in principle and in detail also revealed two basic premises: first — why the first

proposal of the Federal Executive Council that the entire realized surplus of earnings be left to the economic organization for its free disposal — was abandoned, adopting the legal proposal that this should be 50 per cent. And second, how to safeguard the social community from a situation in which a larger income would result in a raise of prices of goods. The best solutions were sought for these two questions. The answers given by the representatives of the Federal Executive Council before the Assembly Committees and Chambers, by the president of the Committee for Economy of the Federal Executive Council as well as by commissioners of the Federal Executive Council boil down to the following: the Federal Executive Council has abandoned its original proposal that economic organizations be given 100 per cent of the realized profit because of the stabilization of the market. This change enables economic organizations, although to a moderate extent, to raise the surplus of income, as against last year's average, from 9 percent to an average of 24 per cent (amounting to about 20 billion dinars). And this means that this sum, introduced through wage and salary funds, will appear on the market and exercise a definite economic influence on the goods and money funds — on the prices of goods on the market. Thus, despite a detailed discussion, the Committee for National Economy adopted the legal proposal as submitted by the Federal Executive Council.

In the Committee for Economy of the Council of Producers the discussion of the deputies evolved practically in one direction: to leave the full 100 per cent of the realized surplus profits to economic organizations. In their speeches, the deputies also supported the position of the Central Committee of the Trade Union Federation of Yugoslavia on the measures for raising the living

PETAR STAMBOLIĆ

THE new President of the Federal People's Assembly, Petar Stambolić, was born in the village of Brezovi near Ivanjica in Serbia on July 12, 1912. He was educated at the secondary school of Čačak and at the Faculty of Agriculture in Beograd. As a student before the war, he participated in the work of the organization of the progressive and democratic students.

Petar Stambolić began to engage in politics in 1931, when he came to study in Beograd, where he immediately found himself in the ranks of progressive students who were then undertaking a series of important actions. In the streets of Beograd, at the University, in student hostels, the students — before the very eyes of the authorities and in spite of them — were then staging mass demonstrations against the military cabinet of General Petar Živković. Petar Stambolić became a member of the Communist Youth in 1933. After two years of work among students, he became a member of the Communist Party, and he undertook to work among the young people of Beograd. Soon after, however, he was called for military service. After his return from the army in 1937, he became a member of the Party Executive, at the University. In 1938 he was chosen for Party work in Serbia.

After taking part in the Fifth National Conference of the Communist Party in Zagreb in 1940, Petar Stambolić went to Niš and Valjevo where he worked as a delegate of the Provincial Party Committee for Serbia.

The outbreak of war found him in Serbia. Immediately after the country's capitulation, he was sent on a Party mission to Pomoravlje, where, as a delegate of the Central Committee, he worked on the organization of the insurrection.

In mid 1941 he worked in the region of Svetozarevo and Smederevska Palanka on the organization of the People's Liberation Movement. In Užice in the Autumn of 1941 he was elected to the Central People's Liberation Committee, and later withdrew with the chief Partisan force to Sandžak. After that he spent some time with the Partisan detachments in Bosnia.

Under very difficult conditions and with the task of establishing contacts between progressive elements in Serbia in order to help organize a widespread liberation movement, Petar Stambolić came to Beograd in the middle of 1943, where he developed very fruitful political action.

In 1944 he was named commander of the People's Liberation Army and Partisan detachments of Serbia, and his headquarters were in Toplice.

After the liberation of Beograd, he was elected first Secretary of the Main People's Liberation Committee of Serbia and then Secretary of the Great Anti-fascist Assembly of People's Liberation of Serbia.

Petar Stambolić was a councillor and member of the Presidency of AVNOJ (the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) after its second meeting in Jajce, then a deputy to the Provisional People's Assembly of Federal Democratic Yugoslavia and since 1955 permanently a member of the subsequent People's Assemblies of Serbia and Yugoslavia. In the second People's Assembly of Yugoslavia he was President of the Foreign Political Committee, and in the present Assembly, prior to his election to the post of its President, he was President of the Economic Committee of the Federal Chamber.

From 1945 to 1948 he was Minister of Finance in the Serbian government and then Federal Minister for Agriculture. From 1948 he was first Prime Minister of Serbia and then President of the Executive Council of the Serbian People's Assembly. At the end of 1953 he was elected President of the Serbian People's Assembly which post he still holds.

Petar Stambolić is Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists for Serbia, member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and member of the Presidency of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia.

He has been decorated with the Medal of the National Hero, the Medal of the National Liberation, the Medal of Brotherhood and Unity, the Medal of Merit, and the Medal of Valour.

standard of workers and office employees. It was pointed out that economic organizations would not distribute the whole surplus of realized profits in the form of increased wages and salaries, but that considerable sums would be appropriated by the body of workers for special funds so that these sums would not bring any great pressure to bear on the commodity market. After long consideration of all aspects of this problem, the deputies of the Committee for Economy of the Council of Producers likewise agreed that economic organizations be allowed to keep 50 per cent of the realized profits. Besides this, joint commissions of both Committees — of the Federal Council and Council of Producers — were appointed and entrusted with the task of finding a joint solution and coming out before the Federal National Assembly with an identical attitude. The joint commissions of both Committees agreed to adopt the legal proposal on the distribution of income as proposed to the Federal Assembly by the Federal Executive Council. Thus this important dispute was solved, for the present at least, until time and practice should have their say.

This change in the Federal Economic Plan was bound to call forth a change in the Federal Budget for 1957. Under the new system of distribution of the total income, considerable changes have occurred in the distribution of the social product in its elements and beneficiaries. These changes increase the resources of People's Committee and republican budgets by 1 billion and 513 million dinars. For this reason the subsidies to the people's republics which are shown in the Federal Budget for 1957 as their share in the Federal tax on trade, will be reduced by the same amount. Simultaneously with the increase of the resources of the People's Committees and people's republics, the new economic instruments also reduce the resources of the Federal Budget for 1957. The Federal profit tax is reduced by 5 billion and 1·3 million dinars as well as the contribution to the budgets from profits by 7 billion and 330 million dinars, which means that incomes of the Federal Budget are reduced as a whole by 12 billion and 513 million dinars, that is, by the same amount as the subsidy to the people's republics, shown on the side of the Federal Budget in the form of participation in the Federal trade tax.

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The Plenary Session of the Federal Assembly held on March 25 a joint commemorative meeting of both Chambers of the Assembly devoted to the life and work of the late President of the Federal People's Assembly Moša Pijade.

At separate meetings of the Chambers on March 26 a joint meeting of the Federal People's Assembly was convened with the following agenda: Election of the President of the Federal People's Assembly, Report of the Federal Executive Council on the work for 1956 and statement by Mijalko Todorović, member of the Federal Executive Council, on changes in the Federal Economic Plan for 1957.

The president of the People's Assembly of Serbia Petar Stambolić was elected President of the Federal People's Assembly.

The Federal People's Assembly passed a resolution on the Report of the Federal Executive Council approving the work of the Federal Executive Council in 1956.

The explanation which was given before the Federal Assembly by member of the Federal Executive Council

on the changes in the Federal Economic Plan and budget for 1957 once more convinced the deputies and public that the measures taken in our economy are aimed at improving the living standard of workers, materially strengthening the district and communal authorities, which, in addition to economic organizations, also take part in the realized profit of the surplus income.

Special meetings of the Chambers fixed the agenda, the first four items of which fell under the competence of both Chambers: examination of the Draft decision on changes and supplements of the Federal Economic Plan for 1957, examination of the Draft Decision on the approval of preliminary accounts of the Federal Budget Funds for 1957, confirmation of changes and supplements of the Statute of Association of Chambers for Trades and Crafts. These and similar laws which are voted separately at the plenary meetings of the Chambers — must be passed in identical texts and so, after being voted, they must be harmonized by the Chambers through the presidents of the Chambers.

Also on the agenda of the Federal Council were the laws which belong to the exclusive competence of one Chamber: examination of the Draft Law on Attorneyship, examination of the Draft Law on changes and supplements in the Law on National Defence, examination of the Draft Law on changes in the Law on Courts of Justice, examination of the Draft Law on changes in the Law on Public Prosecution, organization of by-elections in the Beograd constituency I.

All these legal proposals were voted at the March session of the Federal People's Assembly while the importance attached by the Federal Executive Council to the Draft Law on Attorneyship, can also be seen from the detailed explanation of the Vice-president Aleksandar Ranković who, emphasized among other things that introduction of social management in attorneyship is in keeping with the development of our socialist democracy and that legal representation, as a specific public service, is given a very important role as it enters into important and often very complex and sensitive relations.

DOCUMENTS

Bilateral Relations

In the last issue of our journal we published the first part of the Report of the Federal Executive Council which dealt mainly with the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and her foreign relations. That part embraced mainly the examination of the world situation in 1956 from the viewpoint of general principles and Yugoslavia's foreign policy activities.

In this issue we publish the account of bilateral relations of Yugoslavia with her immediate neighbours. In our following issue we will publish the accounts of Yugoslavia's relations with other European countries as well as with the Far Eastern, Middle Eastern, Asian, and African nations.

We must mention here that, under conditions of further relaxation of tension which took place in the first half of 1956, the Soviet Union appeared as a long-term creditor of a number of individual countries.

The recent conflict in Egypt will certainly have some repercussions on world economy. At present, it is

certain that the most harmful effects of the conflict will be felt by the economy of Western Europe. In addition to the difficulties in supplies, production costs themselves will inevitably rise, and that in turn will create new difficulties in trade.

YUGOSLAVIA'S GENERAL FOREIGN POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Yugoslavia's activity in 1956 developed along the already established lines of her foreign policy.

In the general international field, the Yugoslav Government acted so as to help to strengthen peaceful and equal cooperation of all states and to implement the methods of negotiations in solving international disputes. Formulating its policy in individual problems, it was guided by the conviction that it was necessary to support every action which can lead to a relaxation of tension and to greater international understanding, as well as to endeavour to neutralise actions through which the policy of blocs and ideological disputes come to expression, i. e. actions which obstruct the affirmation of the policy of peaceful and active coexistence.

In the course of 1956 the Yugoslav Government several times exchanged its views on individual problems of international politics with the top leaders of a number of countries. The Yugoslav Government considers that the practice of such exchanges of views is a favourable and good method to cultivate the acquaintanceship between statesmen and to harmonize their views on matters of common or general international interest.

In political contacts of the leaders of Yugoslavia's foreign policy with representatives of other countries, as in public manifestations and in the United Nations, Yugoslavia, guided by the general principles of her policy and by realistic appraisals of concrete international interests, was supporting all progressive steps and tendencies, which in 1956 particularly developed in the Near East and in North Africa through the struggle of the liquidation of colonial and similar relations of political and economic dependence.

The Yugoslav Government developed particularly lively activity in the second half of 1956 — in the Security Council and the General Assembly — in connection with the events in Egypt and Hungary. The Yugoslav delegation to the United Nations supported the efforts of the Security Council to settle the Suez dispute by peaceful means and through negotiations with full respect for Egypt's sovereignty and international interests in navigation through the canal. In this respect the Yugoslav delegates acted first in the Security Council and then in the General Assembly. They were the initiators of the move for the implementation of the United Nations resolution of November 3, 1950, on the basis of which the general Assembly was called into emergency session to consider the attack against Egypt. Yugoslavia's action in this case was, undoubtedly, a contribution to world peace which was being threatened.

Taking part in the United Nations discussions of the events in Hungary, the Yugoslav delegates endeavoured to help in preventing any sharpening of relations and in creating conditions for a rational study of the causes, scope and consequences of the events, as well as to keep these events isolated from bloc antagonisms and restore peace and order in that country in the interests of its people and peace. Unfortunately, such endeavours were not always successful. The Yugoslav delegation had

to voice its disapproval of those resolutions which were of a propaganda character and which tended to sharpen relations still further.

In 1956, Yugoslavia's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe continued to be regulated. Here we must mention President Tito's visit to the Soviet Union and Rumania in June 1956. In the sphere of interstate relations and international politics, the Yugoslav Government worked for an improvement of relations with the East European countries, considering that to be in their mutual interest and in the interest of peace and international cooperation in general. The Yugoslav Government considers that the implementation of the principles of the 1955 and 1956 Belgrade and Moscow declarations on relations between socialist countries corresponds to the interests of such countries and to the general interests of peace. The Government believes that differences in the views on individual matters should not be an obstruction to their relations or cooperation.

The Yugoslav Government endeavoured to expand relations with the Western countries in accordance with the principles of independence, mutual respect and non-interference in one another's internal affairs, and in harmony with the general interests of peace and international cooperation. We can say that no disputable issue proved to be an obstruction to the development of friendly cooperation with individual countries on the above mentioned principles, and that further progress was made in this development.

In 1956 further efforts were made to expand our economic relations with foreign countries, for international economic cooperation is an important part of the policy of active coexistence. During the year we expanded our economic relations with other countries, both in variety and scope. The concrete forms and character of the documents which regulate these relations are conditioned by the degree of our economic development — primarily by our balance of payments, as well as by the situation on the world market and in international relations in general.

Yugoslavia, as an insufficiently developed country, is especially interested in expanding economic relations with other countries, and she is endeavouring to develop such relations with all countries as uniformly as possible. Corresponding forms of economic cooperation with other countries will make it possible to speed up the development of our productive forces. Endeavouring to expand her economic relations with other countries, Yugoslavia, believing that world economy is a single unity, last year supported all actions to remove the barriers to the development of relations on the world market.

Yugoslavia's activity in the economic field in 1956 came to full expression, not only in regulating bilateral relations, but also in the work of international economic organizations, as well as in a gradual introduction of various forms of multilateral economic cooperation. The efforts of the Yugoslav economy to increase its volume of exports in 1956 brought about an expansion of our economic relations with a number of countries. As a result, Yugoslavia last year considerably increased her exports to the countries of Europe and Asia, and some increases were also made in exports to the countries of Africa. The expansion of exports made it possible to increase our purchases on foreign markets. Imports of considerable quantities of consumer goods (about 9.6 billion dinars worth) changed the structure of our purchases abroad. Further, the expanded exports decreed as

the deficits in our balance of payments in 1956. Our activity in expanding economic relations with other countries — the increasing of exports, the conversion of our post-war commercial debts, the securing of investment credits at favourable terms, the regulation of our claims from Western Germany and Hungary, etc., were of great importance for the country's programme of development, so that we created a favourable basis for the realisation of the tasks which we face in the international economic field.

II

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Applying the general principles of its foreign policy of active and peaceful coexistence and the development of international cooperation based on the principles of equal rights and the promotion of mutual interests in the course of 1956 the Yugoslav Government endeavoured to strengthen and consolidate its relations with all neighbouring countries; normalise and broaden its relations with its East European neighbours and contribute to the elimination of difficulties which impeded tripartite cooperation within the Balkan Alliance last year.

The development of Yugoslav relations with the neighbouring countries of Eastern Europe evolved within the framework of the aforementioned principles according to which the Yugoslav Government approached the further normalization of relations and the creation of conditions for broader mutual cooperation. Closer contacts were established and a Government and parliamentary delegations were exchanged with Bulgaria and Rumania, and decisions adopted to expand political, economic and cultural relations on that occasion. Owing to the influence of different factors the extent, scope and rate of development of these relations was not the same with these countries.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA

Notwithstanding the efforts made by the Yugoslav Government the Government of the People's Republic of Albania did not show any greater interest for the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia in the course of last year. Thus the Albanian Government did not take any measures for the elimination and rectification of the unfounded accusations against our country proffered during the previous years at various trials and the anti-Yugoslav campaigns waged, nor did it adopt a more friendly attitude towards our country.

Some previous statements made by responsible individual Albanian statesmen could have been expected to mark the beginning of better mutual relations. We must note however that these statements were never fulfilled in practice which inevitably had a negative influence on the relations between the two countries.

The recent events, such as the ever broader campaign against our country over the press and radio, the arrest and internment of Yugoslav citizens one of whom was sentenced to death and executed, the incorrect treatment of our representatives in Albania, the introduction of certain measures on the frontier towards Yugoslavia which recall the times after 1948, indicate the lack of every desire on the Albanian side to improve relations with Yugoslavia.

Economic relations with Albania evolved according to the Trade Agreement signed in Tirana in December

1955 which calls for 1,500,000 dollars worth of exchange both ways. Of this amount only 400,000 dollars worth of trade was done.

The following instruments were concluded during 1956; The Convention on the Preservation and Maintenance of Frontier Pyramids and Markings, an Agreement on the establishment of air traffic and an Agreement on the regulation and exploitation of water resources.

AUSTRIA

The state Treaty with Austria which became effective in November 1955 resolved certain previously controversial issues between Yugoslavia and Austria, such as the problem of former Austrian property in Yugoslavia. The regulation of these problems created favourable conditions for the further development of still better relations between the two neighbouring countries.

Yugoslavia always extended her heartfelt support to the Austrian people in its efforts to achieve and strengthen its independence. Our country welcomed the establishment of independent Austria and the proclamation of the Constitutional Law on permanent neutrality which took effect in November 1955 with pleasure. The independent, free and neutral Austria may play a constructive part in the struggle for the consolidation of peace and conditions in this part of the world as well as the development of cooperation between the two countries. Yugoslavia always indorsed and will continue to extend her efforts in this direction.

Our relations with Austria evolve in lively cooperation on the economic, cultural, sporting and other domains. As a neighbouring country Austria is an important foreign trade partner of Yugoslavia. However, the favourable conditions provided by the proximity of the two markets and the complementary character of our economies have not been wholly utilized yet. Therefore the common efforts to eliminate the obstacles which impede the increase of commodity exchange and expansion of economic cooperation should be continued in the future.

The Yugoslav Government expects that the Federal Government of the Republic of Austria will enforce Art. 7 of the State Treaty on the rights of the Slovene and Croat minority in Austria which will doubtless provide yet another stimulus to the development of goods neighbourly relations and friendly cooperation between the two countries.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

A certain improvement of relations with Bulgaria was noted in 1956. The exchange of parliamentary, trade union, youth and other delegations contributed to the improvement of mutual relations, while contacts were also established between the responsible political leaders of both countries.

The following agreements were concluded between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the course of 1956: Trade Protocol for 1956 which provides for nine million dollars worth of trade both ways, and Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, a Protocol on the application of the Most Favoured Nation Clause in mutual trade, an agreement on mutual exchange of official publications, as well as a convention on the preservation and maintenance of frontier markings, on extradition and on extension of legal assistance. The frontier line was also retraced, while joint preparatory work was conducted for the regu-

lation of the upper course of the Timok river. A Trade Protocol for 1957 providing for seven million dollars worth of trade as well as a Cultural Convention were concluded in Beograd at the end of December 1956. No less than twenty four agreements, protocols and conventions have been signed since the normalization of relations while talks are currently in progress on the conclusion of a new agreement on the retracing of the frontier line. The Government expects that it will be possible to conclude several other agreements in the near future, among which an agreement on dual ownership properties (persons owning land on both sides of the frontier), on the opening up of new frontier passes, crop protection, automobile traffic, etc.

It should be said, however, that apart from the fact that substantial progress was achieved in the stabilization of contractual relations between the two countries, our general relations with Bulgaria have still not reached the level possible in view of the objective conditions that prevail for closer and broader cooperation. On its part the Yugoslav government is doing and will continue to do everything to develop mutual relations still further and expects the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to do the same, this being in the interest of both countries.

THE BALKAN ALLIANCE

As for tripartite cooperation with Greece and Turkey within the framework of the Balkan cooperation should not be considered as result of a specific temporary situation in international and Balkan relations. On the contrary it considers that essentially cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey is a manifestation of the lasting interests of peoples of these countries and the interest of peace.

The disturbances in the Greek Turkish relations which became particularly acute in their disagreement with regard to the solution of the Cyprus problem, halted the successful development of tripartite cooperation after a promising start. We must therefore note with regret that no progress was achieved in the field of tripartite relations last year.

The Yugoslav Government will continue its endeavours to find possibilities of contributing to Greek Turkish understanding. If this were accomplished the three partners would certainly find a way of continuing mutual cooperation successfully.

During the visit of Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis to Beograd last December, the possibilities were examined for the development of tripartite cooperation between the countries of the Balkan Alliance. They consider that the accomplishment of this aim would most effectively eliminate the causes underlying the present difficulties.

GREECE

Significant headway was registered last year in the development of Yugoslav Greek relations which are based on common interest, mutual understanding and traditional friendship. The visit of the President of the Republic to the King of Greece at Corfu and the visit of Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis to Yugoslavia contributed particularly to the further development of close links between the two countries. The identity of views on many problems of a bilateral and international character was manifested during the contacts of the

leading statesmen of the two countries. An invitation was extended to the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj to visit Greece.

Many mutual visits of trade, military and other delegations as well as cultural troupes and sports teams deepened the acquaintance between the two peoples.

Mutual cooperation was expanded in this spirit. Commodity exchange increased after the conclusion of the new trade protocol. There are genuine possibilities however for the further expansion of economic relations which will doubtless be facilitated by the recently concluded Protocol on economic and technical cooperation. Arrangements were concluded on Lake Dorjan, or sanitary protection in the frontier zones, as well as on crop protection and tourism.

The deliberation of some outstanding problems between the two countries was initiated at the talks in Beograd and Athens, including also the problem of small border traffic and dual ownership properties. The Yugoslav Government expects that mutually satisfactory solutions will be devised for all these problems.

There are still many unutilized possibilities for the deepening and expansion of the existing links between Yugoslavia and Greece. It is in the interest of the further development of relations and the progress of the peoples of the two countries that the cordial relations of the countries be fully attested by all forms of cooperation.

TURKEY

The relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey are based on the positive principles formulated in the Ankara and Bled pact, i.e. on the principles of mutual respect and cooperation in the interest of the peoples of both countries and peace in this part of the world.

The needs of long term cooperation make it necessary for the Governments of both countries to work constantly on the development, promotion and expansion of mutual relations. On its part the Yugoslav Government devoted particular efforts towards the development of friendship and cooperation between the two allied countries while bearing in mind that there is no controversial problem between Yugoslavia and Turkey which would prevent the utilization of broad possibilities for the further development of mutual relations.

As for economic cooperation it should be noted that the economic difficulties with which Turkey is grappling during the past few years were also manifested in trade with Yugoslavia. In spite of the efforts made and understanding shown on the Yugoslav trade between the two countries is stagnating. The fact is that Turkey was not in a position to fulfill her obligations with regard to grain deliveries. The Yugoslav Government therefore noted with regret that wheat deliveries were committed also last year thus leading to an undesirable reduction of commodity exchange between the two countries. This situation requires new efforts to find ways and means for the utilization of all possibilities thus enabling these difficulties to be overcome as soon as possible.

Although the actual possibilities are still not exhausted cooperation in the cultural fields has already yielded results. Mutual visits of scientific and cultural representatives have enabled deeper mutual knowledge to the cultural achievement of the two allied countries.

ITALY

The further development of relations with Italy continued in the course of 1956. Some problems relating to the former Free Territory of Trieste, and economic and other interests in the two countries were resolved. In determining the legal status of the parts of the former Free Territory of Trieste the two Governments agreed to raise the former representative missions in Trieste and Kopar to the rank of General Consulates. The demarcation of the state frontier in the sector of Trieste and to the north of Trieste was approached, so that one may reasonably hope that the frontier will be definitely traced also in this sector. The necessary steps have been taken to reach a solution of the other problems of a territorial nature such as the transfer of funds of Italian citizens who sold their property and left the territory which was incorporated into Yugoslavia, the rights of Yugoslavs who are natives of and live in Trieste area in connection with the obligations ensuing by the Memorandum on Understanding, the question of options and cultural restitutions according to the Peace Treaty. Talks on the remaining problems were opened between the two governments in October 1956, but were unfortunately suspended owing to the fundamental differences in the approach to those problems. The Yugoslav Government is ready however and wishes to continue the talks on these matters which should be resolved within the framework of obligations of both sides and the instruments signed so far.

In the field of economic relations it should be stressed that trade developed favourably last year which confirmed the justified hopes and the possibilities of more intensive economic relations between the two neighbouring countries. During the January—September period of 1956 exports to Italy were 10 percent more than in the same period of 1955, while imports declined slightly. Italy is still one of the leading Yugoslav foreign trade partners. The Agreement on technical cooperation was successfully implemented last year as well as commodity exchange in the Gorica, Videm, Sežana, Nova Gorica and Tolmin frontier zones according to the agreement concluded in 1955. Trade with Trieste was on a comparatively low level however as the Trade agreement between Trieste and the Yugoslav border zone districts was ratified by Italy only in December 1956.

Two important instruments, a Fishing Agreement and an Agreement on special deliveries were signed in Rome on March 1, 1956. Under the terms of the Fishery Agreement Yugoslavia granted the fishing rights to Italy in certain zones of the Yugoslav territorial waters over a three year period, in return, the Italian Government was to have opened a 45 million dollars investment credit to Yugoslavia at a lower interest rate and a longer term of repayment. However while the Yugoslav Government fulfilled its obligations and enabled the Italian fishermen to profit by the concession granted the Italian Government notified our country at the beginning of October that it is not in a position to fulfill the agreement signed under the conditions stipulated. Italy at the same time expressed her readiness to hold talks on the payment of compensation for the fishing rights granted in the zones foreseen by the Fishery Agreement. These talks were held in Beograd and on December 11, 1956 a Supplementary Protocol was signed to the Fishery Agreement according to which Italy will pay 1,250 million lire to Yugoslavia as compensation for fishing rights in the zones stipulated up to December 31, 1958.

Certain problems ensuing from the non-fulfillment of the agreement on special deliveries were resolved by special agreement. In the second half of January 1959 talks were opened in Rome on the conclusion of a new credit agreement.

In the course of 1956 the Italian courts instituted proceedings against certain persons of Yugoslav nationality for their part in activities aiming the solution of the problem of the former Free Territory of Trieste before the enactment of the Memorandum on Understanding, although under Art. 6 of the latter the Italian Government assumed the obligation that it will not take such an obligation that it will not take such steps. In spite of this, twelve years after the end of the war, in which the Yugoslavia was the victim of aggression the Italian courts instituted proceedings against the Venetian partisan company for example whose members fought during the war within the Yugoslav People's Liberation Army. Such an attitude is entirely unjustifiable, all the more so in the Art. 16 of the Peace Treaty the Italian Government assumed the solemn obligation that it will refrain from any such measures. The steps taken by the Italian authorities cannot contribute to the development of good neighbourly relations. The Yugoslav Government hopes that such and similar difficulties which are obviously not in the interest of either country will be eliminated.

The Yugoslav Government considers that all the necessary conditions exist for the development of friendly cooperation with neighbouring Italy according to the principle of mutual respect of rights and obligations. It should be expected that the results achieved by mutual efforts in the sphere of cooperation will be extended to many and various domains.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

A perceptible improvement was achieved in Yugoslav Hungarian relations during 1956. Several important problems were resolved which impeded the normal development of mutual relations while the solution of others was approached. Several mutual visits took place including that of a Hungarian party delegation, while the legations of both countries were raised to the rank of Embassies in October 1956.

An Agreement on the settlement of outstanding financial and economic problems was concluded on May 29, 1956 according to which Hungary assumed the obligation to make 95 million dollars worth of deliveries to Yugoslavia over the next five year period. The implementation of the agreement is under way: individual agreements were concluded on the delivery of 45 million dollars. The settlement of this problem brought about the necessary conditions for the broader development of economic relations. Apart from the Agreement of scientific and technical cooperation concluded on May 29, regular trade agreement from June 1956 to December 1958 to a volume of almost 40 million dollars was concluded on June 21, as well as a Convention on the maintenance and restoration of frontier markings on January 18, 1956, and an Agreement on air traffic on July 21, 1956.

Substantial headway was also made in the field of cultural, scientific and sporting events by comparison with the previous year. There is interest on both sides for the faster promotion of this cooperation in the future,

However the solution of some other problems of mutual interest was prevented by the events which took place in Hungary in October 1956. Some problems were nevertheless resolved. The Minutes between the Government representatives of the two countries on the repatriation of the Hungarian refugees who crossed into Yugoslavia after October 23, and the restitution of property the refugees brought into this country and which belongs to the People's Republic of Hungary were signed on November 24.

Talks were held with the Hungarian Government during the course of November on the problem of asylum granted by the Yugoslav Government in its embassy in Budapest at the request of the former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy and several other persons. According to the agreement reached between the two governments on the cessation of asylum to Imre Nagy and others, the Hungarian Government guaranteed that these persons will not be brought to account for their former activities and that they will be given safe conduct to return to their homes. The Hungarian Government failed to honour this agreement however.

This could not have a favourable effect on the development of relations between the two countries. In spite of this, however, the Yugoslav Government responded positively within the limits of its possibilities to the request of the Hungarian Government and extended assistance to the Hungarian people by allocating about 150 million dinars worth of food, clothing and medicines to the Hungarian government as well as a two million dollar credit, and granting certain facilities in commodity exchange between the two countries. The Government hopes that it will find a way to develop fruitful cooperation with neighbouring Hungary this being in the mutual interest of both countries.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF RUMANIA

Solid foundations were laid in the course of 1956 for manyfold constructive and friendly cooperation between the two countries. This was notably facilitated by the visit of the Yugoslav Government delegation headed by President Josip Broz Tito to Rumania in June and

the Rumanian Government and Party delegation to Yugoslavia under the leadership of Gheorghiu Dej in October. The talks of the highest Yugoslav and Rumanian statesmen in Bucharest and Beograd represent a significant contribution both to the development of good neighbourly and friendly relations between the two countries and better mutual acquaintance and understanding. The documents signed during these visits confirm the readiness of the two countries to foster manifold mutual relations.

The following instruments were signed during the visit of the Rumanian delegation to Yugoslavia: Trade and Payments Agreement, A Trade Protocol for 1957/60, an Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation and a Convention on Cultural Cooperation. The minimum volume of trade was fixed by these Agreement and both governments made ample allowance for the foreseen to be exceeded in the course of the implementation of the agreement. Talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, on the commodity lists for 1957 and in Bucharest last December, the respective protocol being signed on January 11, 1957.

The two Governments agreed that a Yugoslav Rumanian mixed commission be set up for the management and coordination of work which will be undertaken for the purpose of the exploitation of Danube water power in the Iron Gates (Djerdap) sector. As for dual ownership properties it is stressed in the joint communique that the regulations of this problem should be approached as soon as possible. The necessary preparations for the implementation of these two decisions have already been brought to an end.

In the course of 1956 an Agreement on air traffic, an Agreement on postal service, a Veterinary Convention, a Crop Protection Convention, and a Convention on the Prevention of Contagious Diseases were signed during the course of 1956.

We are convinced that the two countries will continue to devote unstinted efforts to fulfill the instruments signed thus utilizing the existing possibilities and expanding the sphere of friendly cooperation on the principles already adopted.

Joint Communique

the Central Committee of the French Communist Party.

The delegation of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia consisted of comrades: Edvard Kardelj Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Petar Stambolić member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Dobrivoje Rado-

savljević, Veljko Vlahović and Miljan Neorić members of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The delegation of the French Communist Party held talks also with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Comrade Tito.

During its stay in Yugoslavia the delegation of the French Communist Party visited Beograd and several enterprises and cooperatives in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.

In the course of this visit it received detailed information on the economic and

"Talks were held in Beograd and Ljubljana from March 20 to 28 between the delegations of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party and the delegation of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The delegation of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party consisted of the following comrades: Francois Bioux, Raymond Gysau and Valdeq Roche members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party and Pierre Vieux and Jean Ogue members of

political basis of socialist development in Yugoslavia.

A broad and frank exchange of views took place during the talks on current problems of mutual common interest, with particular reference to the international situation, the problems of socialist development in Yugoslavia, the development of the labour movement in France, the relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the French Communist Party as well as problems relating to co-operation in the international workers movement in general.

Both delegations were able to note that the talks between the representatives of the two parties after the interruption of relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the French Communist Party during the past few years are extremely profitable and positive.

These contacts have laid the foundations for the re-establishment and development of normal and brotherly relations between the two parties. The long standing traditions of cooperation between the communists of France and Yugoslavia and between the two peoples, as well as the common interests in the struggle for peace and socialism will contribute to the development of this cooperation.

Both delegations noted that socialism after the Great October revolution in Russia achieved notable historical successes during the past forty years. The ideas of socialism are gaining an ever greater number of adherents throughout the world.

Both delegations stress the immense significance both from the standpoint of theory and practice of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party for the development of the international labour movement as well as for cooperation between communist and workers parties and between socialist countries on the basis of equal rights, non-interference in internal affairs and exchange of experience. Cooperation based on these principles between Communist Parties, as well as cooperation among the socialist countries linked by proletarian internationalism, identity of aim, and mutual respect, represents an immense force and has a vast significance for the consolidation of peace and development of socialism.

Cooperation and exchange of experience between the Communist Parties is fully aware of the lessons of the Great October revolution, the different experiences acquired in the development of socialism and specific national characteristics of the individual countries.

The representatives of the French Communist Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia have agreed that in the present international situation it is necessary to promote the struggle for peace and continue the policy of relaxation of inter-

national tension, extend still stronger support to the policy of peaceful coexistence among all peoples and countries.

In this connection it is necessary to devote fresh efforts to resolve many problems on whose solution the consolidation of peace is contingent, and primarily to emerge from the stalemate reached in the disarmament talks, to prohibit the production and use of nuclear energy for belligerent purposes, bring about a system of European collective security resolve the problem of German reunification on the basis of democratic development and not the resurgence of German militarism.

Both delegations agreed to indorse all efforts which lead to the equitable and peaceful solution of the Algerian problem in accordance with the UN Charter and respecting the principle self-determination in accordance with the common interests of the peoples of France and Algeria and the consolidation of world peace.

As for the outstanding issues in the Near and Middle East it is necessary to take measures ensure peace in this part of the world. In this sense all the forces of peace who acted so effectively during the aggression against Egypt should remain vigilant.

Both delegations agreed that in spite of the differences of view with regard to the interpretation of the events in Hungary it was and is necessary, in the interest of the Hungarian people and the preservation of peace and socialism, to support the revolutionary workers and peasant Government of Hungary under the leadership of János Kádár and the Socialist Workers Party of Hungary.

In connection with the struggle for the defence of the interests of the working masses and the consolidation of peace and socialism, and with a view to contributing to the unity of the workers class, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the French Communist Party consider that it is necessary to develop cooperation with the socialist parties and progressive movements.

The delegations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and French Communist Party consider that mutual relations should evolve on the principles of equal rights, mutual confidence noninterference in internal affairs, on the basis of discussion and eventual frank and friendly criticism on all matters of common interest taking the principles of Marxism-Leninism as the starting point.

The differences of view which exist on individual problems must not, in the opinion of both delegations, represent an obstacle to the realization of normal and successful cooperation in these matters where identity of views prevails between the French Communist Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

The regular exchange of views and intermittent friendly discussions on the problems of interest for both countries and peoples, as well as the tasks which confront the international labour movement can only contribute to the better understanding of the policy of both parties.

It is foreseen that a delegation of the French Communist Party be sent to Yugoslavia for the purpose of studying the conditions and experiences acquired in Yugoslav socialist development in greater detail.

It was likewise agreed to continue the regular exchange of party documents, publications and other information between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the French Communist Party and foster all forms which will contribute to better mutual acquaintance and understanding.

Both delegations finally expressed the conviction that the development of mutual cooperation will have a positive influence on the further development of friendly relations between the Yugoslav and French people. In this respect the two delegations stress the significance of economic and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The development of manifold cooperation between France and Yugoslavia will serve the cause of peace in Europe and the world.

CHRONOLOGY

March 16 — The Federal Executive Council held a commemorative meeting at which President Tito and Vice-president Rodo-ljub Čolaković spoke about the late President of the Federal Peoples Assembly Moša Pijade.

March 18 — Funeral of Moša Pijade in Beograd.

March 19 — The Vice-president of the Federal Executive Council Edvard Kardelj answered questions put to him by the Beograd correspondent of UNITA, organ of the Communist Party of Italy. The Beograd newspaper BORBA published the text of the interview which treats some basic aspects of the building of Socialism in Yugoslavia.

March 19 — The High Commissioner for Atomic Energy of France Francis Perrin left Yugoslavia after conducting talks on possibilities of cooperation between the two countries in the field of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

March 19 — A delegation of Yugoslav nuclear scientists headed by Academician Pavle Savić left Beograd for Warsaw.

March 19 — A delegation from the social insurance organization of Czechoslovakia has arrived in Beograd.



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